Aesthetic Intuition Apodicticity
"Making Use" by wilson hurst 2014
This essay is about the problems of philosophical intuition and its potential aesthetic currency. From the position of a working artist, several questions ensue: how is intuition defined, how does it occur, is it valuable, and can it be nurtured? An idealist philosopher, especially important for promoting intuition’s role in aesthetics, Benedetto Croce notably asserted, “Art is intuition” (8). John Mill argued that external truth is intuitively dependent on experience (Kenny Vol4 9). Immanuel Kant considered intuition as the process of sensing or the act of having a sensation (CPR line 649). Aristotle argued that scientific knowledge is intuitively apprehended (33). However, how does this reconcile with claims that the intellect and intuition are entirely separate modalities (CE 70), as positioned by Henri Bergson? Situated within biological evolution, Bergson relates intuition to a harmonic but disinterested instinctual force penetrating “duration” (CM 165) and the “vital impulse” (CE 139). To be disinterested is to harbor no interest in something, completely uninfluenced by considerations of personal advantage.
The above references indicate and John Dewey promotes that, “The term intuition is one of the most ambiguous in the whole range of thought” (294). Nevertheless, as I will articulate in following discourse, understanding intuition supports creative expression, the soul of artistic achievement. Elaborating on intuition’s role in aesthetics, Croce tells us that “What we admire in genuine works of art is the perfect imaginative form that a state of mind assumes there; and this is called the life, unity, compactness, and fullness of the work of art” (25). In Bergson’s analysis, art when based on intuition provides direct [immediate] access to reality, unobstructed by mediating reason. Intuition is often considered an immediate form of knowledge, in which the knower is directly acquainted with the object of knowledge. In this essay, I will argue that intuition, as a valuable cognitive creative process, is neither immediate nor disinterested. I will do this by expanding on ample classical philosophical ideas in the discourse archive, considering intuition in relationship to cognitive processing as much as the product of that process. To elucidate this investigation through a quick reference to history, I chose Aristotle from ancient philosophy, Baruch Spinoza from early modern and Immanuel Kant from late modern philosophy, and Edmund Husserl from early twentieth century philosophy. Aristotle’s dominance in ancient Greek philosophy influenced subsequent conceptualizations of intuition detached from experience. For Spinoza, reason operates incrementally while intuition is an immediate mental revelation. Both of these thinkers’ positions represent views with which I am in partial opposition. In Kant’s definition, intuitions are mental representations generated by sense perceptions structured by space and time. I favor this experiential explanation, although consider cognitively it is more broadly applicable. Husserl established phenomenology, advancing consciousness intentionality implying an interestedness component sustaining intuition.
My intuition interpretation is grounded in the subjective aesthetic drive, the universal need to produce, the essence of creative evolution. In addition to arguing that intuition is neither immediate nor disinterested, I will also argue that intuitive consciousness provides a mental environment in which creative expression flourishes, and this mental state can be actively developed. In support of this position, I will enlist Henri Bergson, Benedetto Croce, and the photographer Henri Cartier-Bresson. In terms of potentially identifying its indiscernible origin, linking intuition with instinct is a reasonable connection. “It is to the very inwardness of life that intuition leads us - by intuition I mean instinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely” (Bergson CE 176). Cartier-Bresson answers Bergson by stating, “In photography, visual organization can stem only from a developed instinct” (43) (fig 1).
fig 1 Henri Cartier-Bresson
Although Bergson distinguishes instinct from intuition because intuition is “disinterested,” I will argue that intuition is a kind of instinct developed through experience. With the phrase “To intuit is to express,” Croce directly connects intuition with aesthetics, claiming that art knowledge is a product of intuition. The consequence of intuition’s extent is evidenced by originality contributed to the human experience. Creative expression is defined as a display, materialization, or revelation of a thought, generally for transmission. Here “creative” relates to and involves the imagination in generating innovative ideas, especially in the production of an artistic work. In the creative process, something new and valuable is fashioned. Originality is “unforeseeability itself” (Bergson CE 95). Intuition functioning as a process to spark inventive insight thus has inherent value. As an expression of relative worth, artists construct and continue constructing. Equating imagination with invention - a form of construction - Paul Klee’s relation between intuition and imagination is relevant to this argument. Paul Klee acknowledges the importance of intuition in his artwork when he explicates the following: “Yet intuition is still a good thing. A considerable amount can be done without it, but not all. There ... is no substitute for intuition” (fig 2). As a tool to see beyond the conventional and the obvious, intuition is a source of inspiration and invention.
fig 2 Paul Klee
Rationality is the process or condition of cognition contingent on fact or reason instead of feeling or emotion. Aristotle states that humans have a rational principle in addition to the instinctual life shared with other animals (318). Reason is the capacity for consciously making sense of things, for establishing and verifying facts, for applying logic, and adapting behavior and thought based on new or existing information. Cognition is mental processing by which sensory input is interpreted, altered, elaborated, condensed, stored, retrieved, and deployed. Kant distinguishes between speculative theoretical cognition which “relates to an object ... which is not given and cannot be discovered by means of experience,” opposed to natural cognition, “which concerns only those objects or predicates which can be presented in a possible experience” (line 15305). Thus, cognition includes attention, reasoning, planning, problem solving, understanding and using symbols, memory, and decision-making. Consciousness is cognitive awareness of an external object or something within oneself. The unconscious, subconscious, and preconscious are all distinctions of cognition that function below awareness. Each of these three terms has been variously defined, with their own established connotations. For the purpose of simplicity, I will combine these three below-awareness states together under the moniker of the avant-conscious. Intuition bridges the avant-conscious and consciousness. Is intuition ontologically idealistic or materialistic, epistemically rational or empirical, or none of these? Perhaps intuition is all of these and more, depending on the interpreter.
Now let us investigate mental processing distinctions, supporting a necessary understanding of intuition to sustain the argument that intuition is an avant-conscious process employing all cognition modalities. As we have seen, intuition is a nebulous concept, a vague evaluation of comprehension precisely unidentified as to its source, but affecting decision-making. Can intuition involve a sensory element irreducible to thought, or is intuition a function of thought? Aristotle's metaphysics positioned intuition as part of the intellect, but “at the point where ideas are farthest removed from experience and immediate perception” (Russell 166). So in effect, my argument is in opposition to the Aristotelian concept of intuition as removed from experience and immediate. Yet I do agree with him on the focus and importance of intuition as part of the intellect. “The intellectual virtues are then excellences that make reason come out with truth. There are five states, Aristotle says, that have this effect: skill, science, wisdom, understanding, and intuition” (Kenny 271). Spinoza also allows for the magnitude of intuition, formulating an epistemological theory based on three tiers of knowledge: imagination, reason, and intuition (Kenny Vol 3, 67). “Knowledge of the third kind is called by Spinoza “intuitive knowledge,” and it is clearly the form of knowledge that is most to be valued” (Kenny Vol 3 141). Intuition grasps the essence, understanding universal features and their universal causal order (fig 3).
fig 3 Henri Cartier-Bresson
“This kind of knowledge precedes from an adequate idea of ... the essence of things” (Spinoza Eth, 57). Kant believed both time and space are forms of pure intuition, framing our environment but logically functioning independent of experience (Russell 708). Thus, space and time are structural forms that dictate sensation-processing parameters, but are neither the process itself nor the resulting product. Kant argues that concepts arise from the understanding of intuitions, “by means of sensibility, therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us with intuitions; by the understanding they are thought, and from it arise conceptions” (CPR line 1716). For Kant, intuitions are synonymous with perception while concepts necessarily contain some empirical or sensory evidence. Cartier-Bresson seems to concur when he states “Above all, I craved to seize, in the confines of one single photograph, the whole essence of some situation that was in the process of unrolling itself before my eyes” (22) (fig 4).
fig 4 Henri Cartier-Bresson
For Kant, thinking is only possible by means of universal concepts in the abstract, not by means of a singular concept in the concrete. Thus, mediated knowledge of the understanding is distinct from the immediate knowledge of intuition. “All our intuition is bound to a certain principle of form, and it is only under this form that anything can be apprehended by the mind immediately” (Kant CPR 307). “The whole Kantian conception is summed up in this cerebrated sentence: "without intuition the concept is empty; without the concept intuition is blind"” (Kojeve 117). By this account, somehow intuition directly apprehends objects by means of formal principles. Kant’s description of intuition as synonymous with perception is specific and limiting, not representative of a complete working definition. Intuition by most other accounts is a mental modality beyond sensory perception. Thomas Aquinas opens the possibility that intuition is associated with the intellect: “But intellect and reason differ as to their manner of knowing; because the intellect knows by simple intuition, while reason knows by a process of discursion from one thing to another” (391). It is interesting how Aquinas here anticipates both Hegel and Bergson. In this capacity, the intellect is associated with the ability to conclude correctly what is true or real, and how to solve problems. John Locke claimed, “We can have no knowledge except (1) by intuition, (2) by reason, examining the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, (3) by sensation, perceiving the existence of particular things” (Russell 612). In this case even a staunch empiricist places intuitive knowledge first, separate from perception and reason.
Although Bergson makes a clear distinction between intellect and intuition, he does allow that we can “probably be aided in this [intellect] by the fringe of vague intuition that surrounds our distinct - that is, intellectual - representation” (CE 24). Thus, the intellect can be influenced by a disconnected intuition. Piet Mondrian echoes this sentiment, as the “intellect confuses intuition” (fig 5).
fig 5 Piet Mondrain
Here Mondrian is indicating a compartmentalized notion of intuition, as something separate but detrimentally susceptible of intellectual contamination. Cordoning off thought processes into distinct unaffecting regions, however, seems problematic. As mental powers to think, understand, and form judgments, reason is probably constantly functioning, although perhaps not always in conspicuous conscious awareness. Thinking about the relationships between sensation, perception, and intuition, creativity is balanced across these modalities. Sensation is the most easily definable, as simply the stimulation of the biological sensory system. In the case of vision that would be activation of the rods and cones, which restrict what small part of electromagnetic radiation is made available (less than one percent of the total electromagnetic spectrum) by human anatomy. Perception is the cognitive process that assigns meaning to these raw sensations by organization, identification, and interpretation (fig 6).
fig 6 Henri Cartier-Bresson
Perception is memory and intellect directly linked to signals in the nervous system, which in turn result from physical or chemical stimulation of the sense organs. So sensation is the raw input from sensory receptors, while perception is the identification, interpretation, and organization of sensory signals used to represent and understand those raw inputs.
So far, we have looked at processing distinctions, supporting the argument that although functioning below awareness, intuition employs all cognition. An interpretation of Husserl’s philosophical ideas supports my argument that intuition functions below awareness. He believed pure intuitions occur in autonomous thinking. His phenomenology is a descriptive, non-reductive investigation of whatever appears in the consciousness, in the manner of its appearing. Evidence is experience, and genuine knowledge is intuitive, rather than what is established by inference and deduction. Recognized inferences and deductions would manifest in aware consciousness. Because intuitions function below awareness, their mental process associations are not readily apparent. Yet intuition can engage universals, abstract objects, propositions, and a multiplicity of evident forms of perception. Entering into dialogue with Bergson, Husserl’s philosophical investigations featured intentionality of consciousness as thought is always directed toward or about objects. He developed the idea of intuition modalities. In this regard, he distinguished between sensible intuition, categorical intuition, and eidetic intuition. Through sensible intuition, our consciousness passively formulates a “situation of affairs” where objects themselves are presented. To this situation of affairs, ontological categories relate objects through a faculty of understanding called categorical intuition to create a “state of affairs.” Eidetic intuition (essential intuition) establishes possibility, impossibility, certainty, and contingency among concepts and categories. For Husserl, truth is mainly intuition informing judgment with reference to interest.
This next section investigates the temporal nature of intuition sustaining the argument that as a process, intuition is not instantaneous. Sometimes it seems intuition is immediate, as it suddenly springs into awareness. The term immediate refers to something occurring or done at once, in an instant. “For me the camera is ... an instrument of intuition and spontaneity, the master of the instant which, in visual terms, questions and decides simultaneously” (Cartier-Bresson 15) (fig 7).
fig 7 Henri Cartier-Bresson
However, this is actually the result of an avant-conscious progression. John Dewy tells us “intuition is that meeting of the old and new in which the readjustment involved in every form of consciousness is effected suddenly by means of a quick and unexpected harmony which in its bright abruptness is like a flash of revelation; although in fact it is prepared for by long and slow incubation” (266). This supports the conception that although a product of intuition might seem to appear suddenly, in a flash of inspiration, the avant-conscious process has a long gestation period.
“An intellect bent upon the act to be performed and the reaction to follow, feeling its object so as to get its mobile impression at every instant, is an intellect that touches something of the absolute” (Bergson CE 7). Nevertheless, what is an instant? A systematic series of actions or steps directed to achieve a particular end, any process requires time elapse (fig 8).
There is a limit to the amount of active information focusable in conscious awareness. Underneath this critical conscious thought layer, a potent processing capacity of the avant-conscious mind churns. “My mental state, as it advances on the road of time, is continually swelling with the duration which it accumulates” (Bergson CE 10).
fig 8 Henri Cartier-Bresson
In the case of intuition, the associated “gut feeling” that often is reported as integral necessarily results from a development period, a naturally progressive continuing operation of ripeness. The totality of mental processes, most of which operates in the avant-consciousness, comprises a repository of knowledge and prior experience informing intuition. Intuition as process can correlate to Bergson’s idea of duration, “the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances” (CE 10). We are always engaged in the present informed by our accumulated past, including significant avant-conscious resources. Intentionally leveraging the capabilities of the avant-conscious mind, and an awareness of how it functions, advances aspirations.
Consciousness as awareness is quite limited in its immediate capacity. Cognitive science now postulates the conscious mental processes account for a small percent of brain activity. The avant-conscious mind is capable of ~ ten million observations in any given setting. The conscious mind can only keep track of about one hundred (fig 9).
fig 9 Mental Processing
This functionality is also a surviving economy. We use different brain subroutines at different times because we could not function otherwise. Total awareness constitutes a debilitating mental overload. “We are aware of a tiny fraction of the thinking that goes on in our minds, and we can control only a tiny part of our conscious thoughts. The vast majority of our thinking efforts go on subconsciously” (Gordon). It is from these vast underground mental processes, the avant-consciousness, from which intuition as insight emerges. Regardless of the precise neurological course, the ability to access and utilize intuitive knowledge is extremely valuable in fulfilling creative aspiration. “Composition must be one of our constant preoccupations, but at the moment of shooting [with a camera] it can stem only from our intuition, for we are out to capture the fugitive moment, and all the interrelationships involved are on the move” (Cartier-Bresson 34) (fig 10).
fig 10 Henri Cartier-Bresson
Given the creative power of intuition, awareness of enabling behavior would promote interested inquisitive thinking. Various creative tasks, such as probing thinking, artistic creation, and invention, are intuitively supported by immersion in creative activity, populating the avant-consciousness. Total engagement and commitment exercised in the desired activity leads to more effective intuition actualization in that activity.
When photographing, intuition organizes the radiation patterns found in the field-of view at hand, stimulating action in a complex amalgamation of impulses (fig 11).
fig 11 Henri Cartier-Bresson
Imagination is dreaming up possible scenarios in the mind, while intuition is deciding on their viability without specific articulated evidence or logical reasoning. This distinction relates nicely with Paul Klee, when he says, “The painter should not paint what he sees, but what will be seen” (fig 12). Intuition thus works as indistinct thought made available to the conscious mind for use, drawing on knowledge considered genuine, necessarily compiled from information pre-processed in the avant-consciousness. Not quite an emotion, functioning as a subjective feeling used as an aid to decision-making, intuition seems to be value based. We act in ways that best suit our interest. Thus, it follows that to make even more use of intuitive potential will build on a deeper understanding of the process. Confronted with visual possibility, a “gut feeling” indicates circumstance and energy spent in exploring potential. The reliability of intuition, as opposed to animal instinct, seems empirically to depend significantly on past knowledge and occurrences in a specific area of interest. I will further elaborate on intuition and instinct distinctions later, but for now consider evidence that directed intuition is stronger for individuals who are experts in a specific field of knowledge, and have familiarity with a given situation. A specific knowledge field relates to a discipline, a branch of knowledge. This does not imply that individuals must only be interested in one field of inquiry. Polymaths do exist, whose expertise spans a significant number of different subject areas. Nevertheless, the key to intuition is discipline engagement, with experience building an avant-consciousness register. Masters with many years experience are able to predict intuitively with accuracy within their field of interest, while novices lacking such experience cannot. In his book, The Social Animal, David Brooks tells of experienced soldiers who could look down a street and predict the presence of an IED (improvised explosive device) with incredible accuracy, where all others were oblivious. When asked how they knew, the soldiers could not specially identify the source of this intuition.
fig 12 Paul Klee
In Malcolm Gladwell’s book, Blink, intuition relative to predicating tennis performance is describe as a function of years of experience in the sport. Adriaan de Groot conducted some famous chess experiments in the 1940s-60 (1-409). One of the things he discovered is intuitive knowledge is the result of experience and expertise. Therefore, immersion in the area of interest will increase intuitive proficiency. “In reality, the past is preserved by itself, automatically. In its entirety ... it follows us at every instant” (Bergson CE 11). Intuition arises from familiarity with a given situation, and most of that familiarity is situated in the avant-conscious. Intuition emergent from the combination of experience and expertise indicates the path for its own development: total immersion in an activity or discipline. This gives the avant-conscious mind the opportunity to absorb patterns and make connections (fig 13). In those areas in which a subject is passionate, intentional immersion facilitates intuitional capacity.
Now consider distinctions between instinct and intuition, while investigating the value of intuition and thus its level of participatory interest. This supports the argument that intuition is not disinterested instinct, but functions to realize subject desire. Intuition provides us with observation, understanding, judgment, or faith that we cannot empirically verify or rationally justify. It is a natural ability or power that makes it possible to know something without any proof or evidence, a feeling that guides a person to act a certain way without fully understanding why. However, what is the difference between intuition and instinct? Russell uses the two words interchangeably, whereas Bergson distinguishes intuition as being “disinterested.” “Intuition and intellect represent two opposite directions of the work of consciousness: intuition goes in the very direction of life, intellect goes in the inverse direction, and thus finds itself naturally in accordance with the movement of matter” (Bergson CE 103). “Intuition, at first sight, seems far preferable to intellect, since in it life and consciousness remain within themselves” (Bergson CE 72).
fig 13 Henri Cartier-Bresson
As conceived by both Spinoza and Bergson, intuition is taken to be concrete knowledge as an interconnected whole. This contrasts to a fragmented, “abstract” knowledge supplied by observation. Bergson further positions the intellect connected with space, with instinct or intuition connected with time. “Space, the characteristic of matter, arises from a dissection of the flux which is really illusory, useful, up to a certain point, in practice, but utterly misleading in theory. Time, on the contrary, is the essential characteristic of life or mind” (Russell 795). By this account, instinct is an innate, fixed pattern of behavior in animals responding to definite stimuli. Individual life forms are created with preconceived structures and related capabilities that are species determined. Instinct is reactive while intuition is proactive, both emerging from the avant-consciousness. Nevertheless, instinct autonomously functions without reason; while intuition functions with reason as avant-conscious processing in due course becomes an awareness result. Consciousness requires an intricate organization of interconnected nerve cell networks. At birth, the human being awakes, takes its first breath, and begins to experience life. All conscious thought is thus a function of experience - “being” immersed in a unidirectional time progression. The mind exists and develops its own latent resources, but thinking is an experiential modality.
Bergson relegates knowledge of the real as disinterested, in distinction to processes that are generally employed for practical purpose (CM 159). However, as previously established, intuition is the full mental capacity functioning in avant-consciousness. Even Bergson says that “it must be remembered that the normal work of the intellect is far from being disinterested (CM 177). Many associated visual sensations contribute to the harmonious free play of imagination and understanding. However, philosophically all of consciousness involves intentionality. Directed in thinking toward structures, objects, or states-of-affairs, creativity involves intentionality of consciousness. Simply put, this means that aesthetic thinking is about or directed at something. Phenomenology, as developed by Edmund Husserl, makes thinking central to experience by bracketing-off all questions of real existence, or problems relative to the physical or objective nature of contemplated objects. “Intuition of an essence is consciousness of something, an "object," a Something to which the intuitional regard is directed” (Husserl 10). In this way, subjective perception becomes more pure, disaffected by symbolic meaning. To accomplish this aim requires the exercise of intuitive fulfillment. Being directed towards some goal or object, mental thinking is about something. In the case of aesthetics, Kant claimed this intentionality is “disinterested” pleasure in beauty. For him aesthetics is a pleasure that does not involve desire. Similarly, Bergson claims intuition is disinterested instinct. In conversation with Kant and Bergson, Lacan indentifies the object as the cause of desire, of that which is lacking (Lacan 32). Disinterested can mean the same thing as uninterested, not wanting to learn more about something or become involved in something. More often, disinterested is used to imply impartiality, or being uninfluenced by personal feelings, opinions, or concerns. I wonder how anyone can be disinterested in experiencing satisfaction and enjoyment, or that these goals are not personified. As a functioning artist, I actively seek aesthetic occurrence and desire drives this interest. “From the moment that I began to use the camera and to think about it ... I became serious. I was on the scent of something, and I was busy smelling it out” (Cartier-Bresson 20). As a refinement and distinctive nuance, how does the idea of disinterestedness, also used by Kant to describe judgments of taste, relate to intuitive aesthetic response in image making? Dewey responds to Kant’s notion of disinterestedness: “Because interest is the dynamic force in selection and assemblage of materials ... no amount of technical skill and craftsmanship can take the place of vital interest” (266). Dewey acknowledges that art is achieved with consistent nurture of interest.
Advancing the argument that intuition is a valuable artistic modality worthy of amplification, I will now more fully elaborate on the association of intuition and aesthetic creative discovery. Energy, matter, space, and time coincide in lyrical concert with an apparent immediate reality (fig 14).
fig 14 Henri Cartier-Bresson
Understanding and formulating responses to stimulation without apparent effort, intuition is a multifaceted concept incorporating biological, philosophical, and even mystical connotations. Husserl tells us that intuition can become transmuted into eidetic seeing (ideation) - a possibility which is itself to be understood as not empirical. “What is seen when that occurs is the corresponding pure essence, or Eidos, whether it be the highest category or a particularization thereof - down to full concretion” (Husserl 08). When unidentified sources of knowledge, divorced from reason and sensation are privileged, logic suffers by reduction. Nevertheless, as Benedetto Croce tells us, accepting intuition comfortably activates aesthetics between actuality and potential. In Croce’s system, intuition is a simple and elementary form of knowledge, best understood by negation, by defining it by what it is not. Art is not a physical fact, because the physical lacks reality (Croce 9). Art cannot be utilitarian, pleasurable, or a moral act, but rather operates on a higher plane. “As theoretical activity, intuition is against anything practical” (Croce 12). Furthermore, “with the definition of art as intuition goes the denial that it has the character of conceptual knowledge” (Croce 14). Ideality distinguishes intuition from concept and art from philosophy (Croce 15). Directly opposed to Kant, Croce stipulates that intuition is neither perception, nor sensation, nor association; rather it is expression. In his view, deep intuition empowers profound expression.
Intuition often has a mysterious quality to it, even to the mind experiencing the intuition. I have limited this research to the history of philosophy and recent discoveries in cognitive science. It is possible that intuition is a mystical power aimed at human transformation. Some sages consider contemplative spirituality and unexplained intuition the methods by which we focus our minds, purifying and consecrating an inner-space of heavenly Light. Extrasensory perception considered as an intuition regarding events beyond what are discernible through physical senses or deduced from experience or knowledge is potentially relevant. In this exposition, I have chosen to set aside ESP as a source of intuition. The apparently paranormal experience of “seeing” future distant events is not part of this essay. Intuition could be something that is innate and entirely divorced from experience. Its source could be unexplainable, or a gift or emanation from the Gods. However because intuition is a phenomenon that ariseth based on contingency of circumstance, it seems unreasonable that we are born with innate mental capacity relative to our specific locus in historical space/time and associated tribulations.
Is intuition an innate knowledge immediately made available to a disinterested party? In this paper, I have argued that because intuitive consciousness provides a mental environment in which creative expression flourishes, understanding intuition supports creative expression. Furthermore, as intuition is a kind of instinct developed though experience and expertise, this desirable mental state can be actively developed through immersion. As a valuable cognitive creative process, intuition in this regard is neither immediate nor disinterested. It is rather an avant-conscious process employing all forms of thought functioning below awareness, with a gestation period. For the artist, desire manifests to express what has yet to be expressed, to make what has yet to be been made, and to communicate that which has yet to be communicated. Essentially, it is just these possibilities that render intuition a mental occurrence of intense interest. Intuitive processing is a potent force in accomplishing imaginative mental goals, satisfying creative desire, a central lack needing realization (Lacan 105).
fig 15 Henri Cartier-Bresson
Therefore, interest in intuition and methods of intuitive enhancement are of considerable interest to the creative mind desiring expression. Certain circumstances of disparate elements combine through appearance in a conscious episode appropriate for expression. Intuitive visual art making involves seeming. Things just seem right, without specific reasonable justification. “To take photographs means to recognize - simultaneously and within a fraction of a second - both the fact itself and the rigorous organization of visually perceived forms that give it meaning” (Cartier-Bresson 16) (fig 15). Intuition is a progression of trusting both your inherent biology and your accumulated avant-consciously compiled experiences and processing.
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